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ABSTRACT
The platform for General Motor's OnStar telematics service is the product of collaboration
between old and new economy capabilities. Cellular wireless service is combined in vehicle
with a global positioning satellite sensor that facilitates the upload of location-based
information to a call center where live agents receive and service customer requests. In
addition, substantial re-engineering of vehicle electronics systems has permitted the
transmission to the call-center of diagnostic and emergency information such as engine
performance and airbag deployment notification.
With plans in place to support one million North American subscribers by the end of calendar
year 2000, OnStar began an assessment of opportunities in Japan, the second largest one-
country vehicle market. This was managed jointly between OnStar and e-GM, the e-
business division of General Motors. The author of this thesis was a co-lead for this effort
during his internship from June through December. The purpose of the assessment was to
identify opportunities to satisfy three objectives for General Motors:
1) To be a profitable mobile services provider in the Japan market, regardless of the platform
chosen for service delivery.
2) To develop relationships with non-automotive Japanese partners.
3) To develop market knowledge and experience in Japan that may be exported to other
regions.
This thesis documents that assessment and its conclusions. It include an assessment of the
current state of Japanese mobile services in and around the vehicle, the proposal of two very
different market-entry strategies, evaluation of those strategies from a financial perspective,
and conclusions and recommendations for GM's future approach to investment in the area
of Japanese telematics.
Thesis Supervisors: Charlie Fine, Chrysler LFM Professor of Management
Richard Larson, Professor of Electrical Engineering
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 GM BACKGROUND
General Motors Corporation, with global automotive sales of over 8.7 million vehicles in
1999, is the largest vehicle manufacturer in the world (1, p.32). However, market share has
declined steadily in the recent past, with US brand leader Chevrolet declining from around
19% in 1990 to about 15% in 2000 (1, p. 114), overall US market share declining from
33.9% in 1992 to 28.9% in 1998, and worldwide market share declining from 15.5% in 1995
to 14.1% in 1998. Margins have also come under pressure, with return on sales falling from
4.1% in 1995 to 2.1% in 1998.
Perhaps due to investor excitement over "new economy" enterprises, GM's stock has
performed poorly in recent years compared to the market as a whole. Whereas in 1982-1983
both the S&P 500 and GM stock traded with P/E multiples of around 10, by 2000 the S&P
500 had risen to around 30, while GM still traded at 10 (1, p. 9).
In opposition to these trends, GM management has sought to bolster revenue growth as
well as the company's image with investors by moving toward the "new economy." Some of
these efforts have centered on the identification of new business opportunities intended to
generate revenue from internet-related and service-based business models. In the Fall of
1999, GM announced the formation of "e-GM", whose mission is "To make GM the global
leader in e-business in the auto industry, and apply the power of its technology innovations
and the Internet to redefine the way it does business with consumers, dealers and suppliers."
GM Vice President Mark Hogan, formerly President of Small Car Group, was appointed to
lead the new Division, and simultaneously promoted to Group Vice President.
Even prior to the creation of e-GM, GM made new economy forays through acquisition and
internal development. In 1994, GM purchased Hughes, Inc., including its satellite TV
business. In 1996, GM launched the OnStar suite of vehicle-based wireless services.
- 10 -
1.2 ONSTAR OVERVIEW
OnStar's basic platform is the product of collaboration between old and new economy
forces. Cellular wireless service is combined in vehicle with a global positioning sensor that
facilitates upload of location-based information to a call center where live agents service
customer requests. In addition, re-engineering of vehicle electronics systems has permitted
transmission to the call-center of diagnostic and emergency information such as engine
performance and airbag deployment notification.
Figure 1 - OnStar North American Service Architecture
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Call Center Operator
Service Providers
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Vehicle data, 3-button u
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GPS Signal
lied Equipment
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d cell-phone,
Receiver,
icle electronics
The combination of these capabilities has resulted in the creation of a new business-model
for General Motors: one which is based on ongoing service revenues, not single-transaction
purchases of new vehicles.
The services that can be conceptualized for OnStar fall into different categories of user-
need. These span areas including security, convenience, and entertainment. Current
services are concentrated in the areas of security and are comprehended within a "Basic"
subscription plan. A "Premium" plan is created by layering in several convenience-related
services.
- 11 -
Table 1 -OnStar Services
Basic (Safety & Security) Plan Premium Services Plan
- Automatic Notification of Air Bag Deployment - Route Support
- Emergency Services - RideAssist
- OnStar MED-NET - Information/ Convenience Services
- Roadside Assistance - Concierge Services
- Stolen-Vehicle Tracking
- AccidentAssist Plus, soon-to-be-offered
- Remote Door Unlock - Personal Calling
- Remote Diagnostics - Virtual Advisor
- Hands-Free Communication
Although OnStar began its life as an option available only on GM cars, the service has
expansion plans including contracts with other automotive manufacturers in the US such as
Toyota, Honda, and Subaru. These contracts will permit OnStar to reduce average cost per
subscriber by leveraging its infrastructure (including call center and information technology
investments) across a broader user base.
Recent growth in number of users (one million are expected by early 2001) has been driven
by: (1) the inclusion of OnStar as part of a standard, factory-installed package in a broad set
of GM vehicles; and (2) providing the first year's subscription free of charge. Thus, the
near-term success of OnStar in the North American market depends largely on the rate of
customer retention after the initial free subscription period.
Figure 2 - OnStar User Interface
Convenience
Call center assistance
Audio interface
microphone, car-speakers
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Security
Emergency support
2 PROJECT OVERVIEW
2.1 ONSTAR EXPANSION
2.1.1 Geographic Expansion
OnStar has also had its eye on markets outside of North America, and recently conducted an
analysis of potential geographic expansion opportunities worldwide. Criteria used for
evaluation included basic indicators such as the number of vehicles for which OnStar service
was judged to be relevant ("volume"), the adequacy of the wireless cellular
telecommunications network ("infrastructure"), and per-capita income and technology
acceptance by customers ("demographics") for each region.
2.1.2 Japan Initiative
Japan was identified as a potential market opportunity because of the following factors:
Volume
Nearly 2 million relevant vehicles sold per year. (Relevant vehicles are all passenger vehicles
excluding small, mini, and lower medium categories.)
Infrastructure
Continuous cellular coverage via a common standard.
Demographics
Per capita income 20% higher than the US. Around 60 million wireless cellular subscribers.
The sophistication of wireless infrastructure and penetration of wireless usage in Japan leads
the rest of the world by several years. In May of 2001, so-called "third-generation" wireless
coverage is expected to be initiated in Tokyo on a trial basis at data rates of 64Kbps by
wireless provider NTT DoCoMo (current services are provided at 9.6Kbps). It will be
fanned out nationally to widening segments of the population over the following calendar
- 13 -
year. This coverage will eventually permit download rates of 384 Kbps and upload rates of
64 Kbps. In contrast, Europe is not expected to launch 3G services until 2002 at the
earliest, and the US not until 2003 or beyond.
Because such high speed mobile wireless technology will proliferate more quickly in Japan
than elsewhere, the Japan market may represent an opportunity for OnStar to learn about
customers, services and technology in the Japan environment prior to possible deployment
in North America and other regions.
2.1.3 Project Objectives
In recognition of this possibility and the above evaluative criteria, in June of 2000 an
assessment of opportunities for OnStar-like services in Japan was begun as a joint effort
between e-GM and OnStar, co-led by the author of this document. The purpose of that
assessment was to identify opportunities to satisfy the following three objectives for General
Motors:
1) To be a profitable mobile services provider in the Japan market, regardless of
the platform chosen for service delivery.
2) To develop relationships with non-automotive Japanese partners.
3) To develop market knowledge and experience in Japan that may be exported
to other regions.
2.1.4 Facilities and Data Sources
The research project was based at GM facilities in Tokyo, Detroit, and Troy, Michigan.
Access to project data at all sites was required, including- outputs of a study by a strategy
consulting group, information regarding OnStar's assessment of various geographical
markets, e-GM and OnStar market research conducted in Japan for the project, and the
output of a syndicated study of automotive customers' information and communication
needs by Japanese market research firm IID. Note that GM's actual cost data is proprietary
and was not relied on for this thesis.
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3 STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF ONSTAR IN NORTH AMERICA
In the spring of 2001, OnStar will have over one million active subscribers. In evaluating the
potential for business in the Japan environment, it is helpful to understand the strategic
factors supporting OnStar's success in North America.
3.1 ONSTAR SERVICE WAS "FIRST OF ITS KIND"
OnStar has exploited a first-mover advantage. Except GM, no American automotive
manufacturer has developed a telematics capability.
By growing ahead of competitors, OnStar has lowered the cost of its installed systems by
obtaining volume discounts from hardware suppliers and service providers, and by
continuously improving the cost of installations. GM has made investments necessary to
"design-in" telematics equipment for low-cost factory-installation in most of its vehicle lines.
It has also invested hundreds of millions of dollars in a brand-marketing campaign to
popularize the "OnStar" name and service offering. Finally, by growing its subscriber base,
OnStar has generated promotional support via "word-of-mouth" from existing customers.
This supplements paid promotional efforts and reduces overall customer acquisition cost.
An auto manufacturer attempting to start its own, competing telematics business will face
upfront costs including initial design-in, promotion, and call-center set-up, as well as
volume-dependent costs from suppliers, learning-curve effects, and the amortization of call-
center operations costs. These "scale economies" imply that new entrants would face a cost
disadvantage verses OnStar until obtaining comparable scale.
3.2 THROUGH GM, ONSTAR HAD ACCESS TO 1/3 OF NEW
VEHICLES
The market for users of a given manufacturer's telematics service is bounded initially by the
total number of vehicles it is able to put on the road. Thus, General Motors, who sells
roughly one-third of all new vehicles today, has had greater initial growth potential than any
other single manufacturer.
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Other manufacturers have chosen to outsource telematics to ATX, Inc., which aggregates
services across multiple manufacturers. It provides private-label telematics to luxury lines
such as Mercedes-Benz (DaimlerChrysler) and Lincoln (Ford).
3.3 MOBILE DATA SERVICES MARKET JUST DEVELOPING
When OnStar initiated service, overall cell-phone penetration was relatively low, and there
were few potential substitute services for directions or other location-dependent
information. Today location-dependent information is available in text form via cell-phone
screen, and by voice through "voice-portal" applications such as "Tell Me" and "Be Vocal."
Whereas OnStar was able to publicize and build its initial brand in an environment in which
it provided unique services, new entrants today must compete against these services in order
to build their initial subscriber base.
3.4 HIGH PROPORTION OF CELL-PHONE USAGE OCCURS IN
VEHICLE
OnStar reports that 70% of all U.S. wireless minutes are consumed while driving (2). Thus,
customers generally handle a great deal of their wireless communication needs when in
vehicle. This provides support for the value of future service releases by OnStar, such as
"personal calling", whereby the OnStar apparatus is used as a voice-activated, hands-free car-
phone.
3.5 SAFETY AND SECURITY THE SOURCE OF PRIMARY CUSTOMER
VALUE; NAVIGATION NOT OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
The basic OnStar package is centered on safety and security, which is highly valued by
OnStar customers. Consistent with this positioning, OnStar provides all its functionality
through voice-enabled interfaces. There is no screen to distract drivers, who are able to keep
their "hands on the wheel and eyes on the road" at all times. An added perspective is that
since screen-based navigation systems have fared poorly in the US, the lack of perceived
demand for this equipment has enabled OnStar to pursue an approach based on much
simpler, cheaper hardware.
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4 COMPARISON: JAPAN VS. NORTH AMERICA
4.1 GM-AFFILIATES MAKE UP A SMALL FRACTION OF MARKET FOR
TELEMATICS
Relatively speaking, GM sells few GM-manufactured vehicles in Japan. However, it does
have significant equity stakes in three Japanese automotive manufacturers (Table 2).
Table 2 - GM's affiliated Japanese vehicle manufacturers
Manufacturer Primary Vehicles Sold in the Approx. GM's
Japanese Market Annual Equity
Unit Sales Stake
Suzuki Mainly minis (engine displacements 0.6 M 20%
less than 660 cc)
Subaru Split between sporty practical 0.3 M 20%
passenger sedans/wagons and minis
Isuzu Commercial trucks 0.1 M 49%
GM GM brands including Saab and 0.04 M 100%
Opel
GM-affiliated vehicles collectively account for approximately 1 million of a market of 5-6
million vehicles annually. Although in aggregate this is a significant fraction of automotive
sales, few of these customers are likely to be interested in a consumer telematics package.
First, GM-affiliated vehicle sales through Isuzu (with sales of order 100K annually) are
largely to businesses. If the commercial market constitutes an opportunity for telematics
services, it is one that serves needs distinct from those in the consumer sector'. Of the
remaining 90% of GM-affiliated vehicles sold, about 75%, or 750K, are in markets for very
small "mini-cars" or "second cars". The mini-car (or "K-car") segment is populated by
customers who are extremely price-sensitive in their purchase, having bought cars with tiny
1 Opportunities in the commercial sector lie outside the scope of this thesis.
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engines (less than 2/3 liter) for around $10,000 or less. Thus, any services and hardware
sold in those markets need to be priced very low. Current OnStar hardware has an MSRP2 of
three to five hundred dollars, which amounts to a substantial fraction of the value of such a
low-priced vehicle in a price-sensitive and margin-sensitive market-place.
The remaining set of vehicles potentially relevant to OnStar-like services represents annual
sales of at most 200K. In contrast, GM passenger vehicles in North America account for
annual sales of about 5-6 million, about 25 to 30 times the size of sales of analogous
Japanese vehicles.
Table 3 - GM and afifilated vehicle regIstration, 1998
Passenger Car
Passenger Car (small)
Passenger cat Total
Truck
Truck (small)
Truck Total
Bus
Mini
Mini Truck
Mini Total
Grand Total
GMJ
30,908
13,239
44,147
Isuzu
4,204
2,351
6,555
21,766
57,206
78,972
1,223
Subaru Suzuki
15,410
109,423 33,879
124,833 33,879
1,507 14,697
1,507 14,697
79,998
80,055
160,053
44,147 86,750 286,393
343,169
183,703
527,406
575,982
Thus, the GM-affiliated customer base is by itself not likely to support a viable consumer
telematics service in the tradition of OnStar's North American services. Instead, one must
either provide telematics far more cheaply (so as to make it possible to capture demand
within the "mini" segment) or expand the customer base beyond GM affiliates.
2 MSRP = Manufacturer Suggested Retail Price
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Total
50,522
158,892
209,414
21,766
73,410
95,176
1,223
423,167
263,758
686,925
993,272
4.2 SAFETY AND SECURITY ACCOUNTS FOR LITTLE REVENUE
GENERATION; NAVIGATION IS A KILLER APPLICATION.
Out of more than seven existing telematics services only one, operated by Daimler-Chrysler
for Mercedes-Benz customers, provides safety & security functionality. Indeed, most of the
Japanese vendors to whom we spoke during the course of this study were skeptical about
Japanese customer's willingness to pay for safety and security functionality. Driving in
Japan, while it is easy to get lost, is much safer than elsewhere. Accident and crime rates are
far lower than in the U.S. (see Figure 3).
Figure 3 - Safety Statistics in Japan
Traffic Accidents
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Source: World HeaMt Organizatimn
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In contrast, Japanese drivers' interest in vehicle navigation is high. Currently over 3 0% of
drivers choose to equip new vehicles with navigation equipment (see Figure 4). Recent year-
to-year growth in unit sales is over 15% within the context of a vehicle market where sales
have been roughly flat or declining. This equipment includes location-sensing hardware
(GPS) as well as a dash-mounted screen with on-board database (CD or DVD-ROM) to
provide current locations and directions. The prices for these systems currently range
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between 100,000 and 200,000 yen. This is three to four times the price of OnStar equipment
in the U.S., with a much higher penetration of new vehicle sales.'
Figure 4 - Car navigation system sales as a fraction ofnew car sales excluding
minis and trucks4
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Navigation systems provide particular value to customers in Japan because roads in city areas
are convoluted and the addressing system is of limited use as a navigational tool. Houses in
Japanese cities are labeled by city, neighborhood, and block. Within that labeling, they are
numbered in the order built. Street names are omitted from most addresses, and blocks are
often not square. Thus, locating a new place requires considerable attention, even with a
map.
The use of a dash-mounted screen for navigation is recognized as potentially distracting, but
widely accepted. Such use is in fact master-minded and perpetuated by the Japanese
government. A government-operated infrastructure referred to as 'VICS' (Vehicle
3 I.e., OnStar activates only several hundred thousands of subscriptions per year in a market where over seventeen million
vehicles are sold annually.
4 In Figure 4 - Car navigation system sales as a fraction of new car sales excluding minis and trucks, penetration is estimated
as units sold divided by sales of passenger vehicles excluding all minis and trucks. This is inaccurate because navigation
systems may also be relevant in some trucks and vans. However, exclusion of minis is reasonable: it is unlikely that such
systems would be installed in a mini-vehicle due to the costs involved (typically 10,000 to 20,000 yen) compared to the price
of the vehicles (typically 100,000 yen).
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Information Collection System) tracks and electronically distributes traffic data for visual
display and automated route determination (see Figure 5). The system transmits data via
FM broadcast channels and highway beacons throughout Japan. A range of display
mechanisms of varying degrees of sophistication make use of this information (see Figure 6).
Figure 5 - Vehicle Information Collection Systems (VICS)
Collection of information
Nrf~u~ ~- ow 3 rffc~ft
Processing and editing of information
Providing of information
Utilization of information
VICS Center
Figure 6 -In- Vehicle Displays for VICS Information
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3
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4.3 THE MOBILE DATA SERVICES MARKET IS WELL DEVELOPED
VICS represents a single-minded implementation of mobile data services for the sole
purpose of distributing traffic information to drivers en route. More generally, the Japanese
market for mobile services is broad and well developed. Such services include the following-
- Voice communication via cell phones. As of March 31, 2001, there were 66.8 million
mobile phone subscriptions, up from 58.9 million in March 31, 2000 (4). By the year
2000 Japan was expected to have had a population of 127 million people, with 108
million over age 14 (5). Thus, the number of subscriptions per consumer aged 15 and
over is above 62%. Saturation is expected at penetrations between 80% and 90% (6).
At the above adoption rates, saturation should be achieved within two years
" Data communication via cell phones. As of March 31, 2001, 52% of Japanese cell
phone users subscribed to some form of "wireless web" service (4). This is up from
17% a mere ten months earlier. Such rapid adoption is aided by a cell-phone
replacement cycle of under a year.
Other data services are in their initial stages, including-
* Data services via PDA (personal digital assistant): In most cases, these utilize the cell-
phone as a communication link. Others have that capability built in or provided by
clipped-on wireless modem.
* Data services via in-car navigation system: Beyond the VICS infrastructure used for
information about traffic congestion, telematics systems offering various convenience
and entertainment services are being sponsored by vehicle manufacturers. Three of the
first to introduce such systems were Toyota, Nissan, and Honda. All three utilize the
vehicle navigation screen, GPS, and a cell phone embedded or docked in the unit to
provide text and graphic information services.
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Figure 7 - Features of Some Initial Telematics Systems
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Below is a description of unique aspects of these services.
4.3.1 Toyota Monet
In the Monet system of Toyota launched in November 19997, an electronic female voice
reads out requested information over car speakers. Monet also understands simple spoken
commands, such as "news" and "sushi."
4.3.2 Nissan Compass-Link
Nissan's Compass-Link system, launched in July of 1998, utilizes a call-center with live
operators to respond to requests from car navigation users. Information can be relayed
verbally but also can be downloaded electronically by operators. An example is route-
setting. Car navigation systems can be quite challenging to master. Perhaps the most
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difficult part of usage is locating and setting the initial destination and route. The Compass-
Link operator is able to locate this information and set the route remotely.
Figure 8 - Nissan Compass-Link
C IN K
Compassink Operator
LocatIon-based Info:
* Restaurant
*Parldng
Send information with location data - s d
- Hospital,(dispjayed on car navigation system) Sightseeing spot
G oif course
*Ski
-Event
* Driving plan
Ask for information - E-mail
- Weather forecast
The sewice commenced in Juy 1998.
4.3.3 Honda Internavi
Honda's Internavi system, launched in August of 1998, allows users to access their own
personalized web page from a PC to pre-select driving destination, route, and other travel
information. The user then has the choice of either accessing this information wirelessly
from their car, or downloading it to a memory card that can be inserted in the car navi
system. In addition to such pre-loaded information, users can wirelessly access content from
the internet or the Internavi operations center. Finally, Internavi allows Honda customers
who have not purchased a navigation system to create and utilize a Honda web page to
conduct travel planning from their homes or offices, and it allows access to this information
from web-enabled phones and PDAs. By the middle of last year over 40,000 Honda
customers were reported to have registered for this variety of the Internavi service.
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4.4 MANY VEHICLE MANUFACTURERS AND OTHERS OFFER
TELEMATICS SERVICES
GM was without significant direct competition when it introduced its safety-and-security
focused OnStar services in the U.S. However, in Japan a service providing emergency
notification has existed for over three years. This is ITGS/E-call, operated by Daimler-
Chrysler Japan in support of Mercedes drivers. In addition to information and convenience
services, ITGS/E-call runs a call center whose functions include emergency support and.
automatic airbag deployment notification. The E-call call center was reported by industry
sources to have been expanding service in the fall of 2000. Figure 9 summarizes all services
launched through July of 1998.
Figure 9 - Initial, proprietary approaches to telematics
All prices in yen.
Type Name Launch Unique Features HW Price** Service Pricing Members
ITGS/E-call* Real-time map
updates; automatic Admission: free
o (Daimler-Chrysler Japan) airbag deployment Monthly: Ik Not
4/97 notification Not available + cellular costs available
Monet Admission: 2.5k
Real-time traffic Monthly: 0.6k 10,000 in 3
(Toyota) 11/97 video 50k + cellular costs yrs
Admission:3k
Compass link Live operator Monthly: 2.5k 2,000 in 2
(Nissan, Mitsubishi, BMW) 7/98 assistance 50k + cellular cost yrs
*ITGS - Intelligent Traffic Guidance System; E-call - Emergency Call ** HW Price includes adapter and/or hands-free kit
added to navi. Excludes navi price of IOOk-200k.
Reference (7)
As can be seen from their membership numbers these operations have enjoyed little success.
Potential contributing factors include: systems are difficult to operate, have slow download
speeds (data rates range from 4.8 kbps to 9.8 kbps -- the transmission speed for i-Mode),
lack compelling content, and have poor content for the price.
Perhaps to address these factors, services introduced subsequently support open internet
access and waive subscription fees, choosing instead to charge fees per data packet or service
usage (Figure 10).
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Figure 10 - Recent telematics approaches with non-proprietary content
Type Name Launch Unique Features HW Price Service Pricing Members
Internavi Personalized trip-planning Admission: 2.5k
web-site linked to in-car Monthly: free 7,000 in 2
(Honda) 8/98 service; open internet access 46k + cellular costs yrs
Telemax
(Mazda) Personalized web page, Not Free except
06/00 i-mode content on map available cellular costs Unknown
i-Navi Link
Not 0.1k per request +
(NTT DoCoMo) 07/00 i-Mode content on the map available cellular costs Unknown
Reference (7)
Honda adopts a dual approach, providing location-based services (those integrated with GPS
and navigation) in a proprietary manner, but also allowing users to view the open internet
(Figure 11). It has also succeeded in convincing some equipment manufacturers and content
providers to use its internally developed standard for transmitting location-based
information. Use of the standard allows compatible navigation systems to extract location
information from properly formatted web pages.
Figure 11 - Honda Internavi Service
Digital Content Content Network Network
Content Aggregator Service Prider Consumer
Provider Provider Device
Proprietary Protocol
Content Providers
Content Providers
Content Providers
Services introduced more recently by NTT DoCoMo and Mazda (which utilizes DoCoMo's
service) go further in providing opportunities for content. DoCoMo has extended its
approach from the handset world to the world of car navigation systems. That is, for a fee
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per use plus cellular costs, customers are able to utilize location-based content or i-mode
content that is formatted according to DoCoMo's specifications. And with 22 million
existing i-mode customers and tens of thousands of available content sites (as of March 31,
2001) it should have no problem spreading standards for location-based services. Mazda,
rather than maintain its own proprietary system, has chosen to construct service around the
system architected and controlled by NTT DoCoMo.
Figure 12 - Value chain for NTT DoCoMo's i-Navi-Link
Digital content Content Network Network
Content Aggregator Service Provider Consumer
Provider e Provider P Device
DoCoMo Handsets
Japan RioadSbayFjis
Travel (Japan Aii, JT3 t)Pnsti
iPC (map)
Park24 (Parking Area
ATIS (road traffic info) F
Japan Highway(Search intrtcharges & traffc)
i-Mode compatible
Car Navi
Use r
over
35m
mobile
users
with
22m
i-Mode
users
Figure 13 - Equipment and display for DoCoMo i-Na vi-Link Telematics
- 27 -
General
Services
Car
SpecificI
Service
At the same time, car navigation manufacturers (a fragmented market of more than ten
consumer electronics companies) are scrambling to define their own standards that would
permit service independent of both equipment manufacturer and network service provider.
Figure 14 - Press release: consumer electronics firms cooperate on standards for
internet-enabled car navigation
Monday, August 14, 2000
Sony, 39 Others Join To Standardize Car Navigation System
TOKYO (Nikkei)--Forty companies have launched an association with the
aim of standardizing a next-generation car navigation system, The Nihon
KeizaiShimbun learned Monday.
The firms include Matsushita Communication Industrial Co., Sony Corp.
and major map producer Zenrin Co.
In an effort to promote the use of the navigation system, the body will
standardize communications protocol such as that used in transmitting
data on roads, buildings and other map information.
The navigation system, which is expected to be commercialized as early
as next year, will enable drivers to get map data and a wide range of
other information via the Internet through a cell phone embedded in the
system.
The system will also act as an information terminal, capable of
exchanging e-mail, making restaurant reservations and downloading music
or games.
In fact, some car navigation manufacturers already offer telematics services to go along with
their more advanced car navigation systems (little detail was known about these systems at
the time of this study).
In the area of safety and security, a broad consortium of automotive manufactures, car
navigation manufacturers, telecommunications companies, and government agencies have
co-invested since September 1999 in a jointly owned company focused on the design and
operation of in-vehicle emergency response systems. The company is called Japan Mayday,
and has defined a set of standards for emergency response that utilize wirelessly connected
navigation services. The "Helpnet" approach will put a button on compatible car-navigation
systems that users can press for immediate connection to an emergency call center. As of
the summer of 2000, the founders of Japan Mayday expected to start service in September of
that year, concurrent with the launch by Toyota of a vehicle containing a factory-installed
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version of the equipment. Factory-installed versions of Helpnet support automatic
emergency notification for airbag deployment. Led by a retired president of the Japan
police, Helpnet's founding team consists of semi-retired executives from majority owners,
including Toyota, NTT, Nissan, and others. In some respects, the business resembles a
public service, with an initiation fee of 6000 yen, and an annual subscription fee of 4000 yen
(under 40 US dollars).
Figure 15 -Japan Mayday Service Co., LTD (HELPNET)
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4.5 SMALL PROPORTION OF CELL-PHONE USAGE IN VEHICLE
Since they drive less than North Americans, Japanese drivers meet a relatively small fraction
of their overall communications needs while driving. Whereas it is not uncommon for a
North American to spend 1-2 hours driving daily and make 70% of phone calls from the car,
Japanese drivers drive an average of only about forty to fifty minutes daily (8). Many city
dwellers spend an equal or greater amount of time commuting by train or on foot, so that
the majority of customers' mobile communications needs are probably met outside the
vehicle. Thus, the maximum value that can be provided by a separate, in-car system for
mobile communications is small compared to a system that can be used outside the car, and
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Japanese may therefore not be willing to pay as high a price for a separate, in-car service as
North Americans.
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5 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON GM'S RELEVANT
STRATEGIC ASSETS
Any mobile service venture that GM creates in the Japan environment will benefit to the
extent that it can apply capabilities already developed by the North American OnStar team.
These capabilities include the following:
5.1 INTEGRATION WITH VEHICLE ELECTRONICS
GM, and more specifically OnStar, has more experience designing communication links to
in-vehicle electronics than any other organization. This has included design of air-bag
deployment sensors, systems for communication of various vehicle diagnostics, and
convenience features like remote door unlock and horn honk.
However, two points must be given careful consideration in evaluating these capabilities.
First, the efforts required to design such systems are extremely specific by vehicle model.
Whereas OnStar believes that preparation of factory-installed equipment for a vehicle line
that has an electronics infrastructure consistent with that of GM may take as little as a year,
the efforts required to perform the same work on vehicle models of Japanese affiliates may
take three years.
Second, the intellectual property on which these systems are founded is not strategically
defensible. There are multiple ways to construct the integration with vehicle electronics for
a given vehicle line, and industry standards govern important aspects. Therefore GM cannot
"lock-up" access to the requisite capabilities through patents or secrecy.
What GM/OnStar does have is experience integrating telematic electronics in vehicles to
serve customers. It should be able to perform this integration more quickly than less
experienced players.
- 31 -
5.2 VOICE RECOGNITION
From 2001 onward implementations of OnStar in North America will include a set of
features referred to as the "Virtual Advisor." It involves the inclusion of vehicle hardware
and server-side software which enables OnStar customers to review and manipulate online
content sources using voice recognition and voice synthesis. It is literally a "voice portal"
similar in spirit to services provided on handsets by "TellMe" , "BeVocal", and others. It is
intended to be personalized via user pre-configuration of online web-pages.
These voice recognition capabilities require a significant level of development, testing, and
integration within actual vehicles. However, voice recognition functionality is somewhat
specific by language, and technology development for Japanese voice-recognition is
approximately one year behind English.
Nevertheless, OnStar has significant experience in integrating voice recognition in a uniquely
noisy vehicle environment. It should therefore be able to perform such integration more
quickly than inexperienced players.
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6 INFERENCES FROM PRELIMINARY U.S./JAPAN
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
The comparative analysis above suggests the following:
6.1 ANY NEW MOBILE SERVICE VENTURE IN JAPAN WILL FACE
SIGNIFICANT COMPETITION.
Customers will have multiple choices for satisfying their mobile service needs inside the
vehicle. Furthermore, competition is likely to come from experienced sources -- firms who
have been providing mobile services for several or many years.
6.2 THE MOST SUCCESSFUL SERVICES WILL LEVERAGE SYSTEMS
ADOPTED FOR USE OUTSIDE THE CAR.
Customers have already invested heavily (in yen and learning) in order to adopt mobile
service solutions that meet needs outside the vehicle. They will continue to utilize those
services in the future, and will spend far more time using such services outside the car than
they will spend using any service inside the car. Therefore any service offering that attempts
to replace that investment while consumers are in the car (instead of supplement or
complement it in an efficient fashion) will appeal to few customers.
6.3 IT IS UNCERTAIN WHETHER JAPANESE CUSTOMERS WILL PAY
FOR SERVICES RELATED TO SAFETY & SECURITY.
First, the introduction of such services would need to overcome skepticism among necessary
participants in Japanese industries (communications, electronics, automotive). Currently, the
fraction of overall mobile service revenue coming from safety and security is small. Second,
Japan is a far "safer" environment than the U.S.
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6.4 THE MOST SUCCESSFUL SERVICES WILL INCLUDE OR
COMPLEMENT NAVIGATION
Navigation services are a subsidiary part of U.S. OnStar's primarily safety-focused. In Japan,
navigation plays a more fundamental role, and will soon achieve high levels of penetration.
OnStar in Japan must comprehend this difference, either by providing navigation service or
by designing systems and strategy to work in tandem with navigation providers.
6.5 POTENTIAL CONSUMER MOBILE SERVICE REVENUES FROM
GM-AFFILIATED VEHICLES ARE SMALL.
Customers of GM affiliates account for a specialized share of the overall vehicle market and
cannot be counted on to support a viable mobile service business in and of themselves.
6.6 ONSTAR HAS SIGNIFICANT CAPABILITIES FOR VEHICLE
INTEGRATION OF TELEMATICS BUT THESE MAY NOT BE
READILY APPLICABLE IN JAPAN
OnStar should be able to implement voice-recognition and safety-focused systems more
quickly than inexperienced players. However, this may take several years, and other entities
in the Japanese market have already developed these capabilities at some level.
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7 PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS: CONTENT AGGREGATION
OPPORTUNITIES
In August of 2000, a consulting team assisted in evaluation of market trends and competitive
environment for mobile services in Japan. The conclusions from that analysis were two-
fold. First, it was concluded that OnStar services in the North American vein were in-viable,
primarily due to an assumed lack of customer interest in safety and security. Second, the
recommendation was made that GM form alliances with partners to bring to market a
content aggregation business. The proposal was to aggregate location-based and other
content relevant to driving and travel in order to create a mobile web-portal for car
navigation systems and other internet access channels. By doing so, GM and its partners
would address a need for collection and integration of such services that would grow as open
standards proliferated.
It was reasoned that with the significant increase in data transmission rates starting in 2001, a
set of service possibilities would come into existence that would be exciting to customers.
Furthermore, the trend toward proliferation of open standards would create an environment
in which such services would be easy to generate. And finally, an increasing fraction of car-
navi systems will be equipped with data-communications links. These capabilities will
continue to penetrate manufacturer-installed equipment as in current telematics systems.
However, they will also penetrate the large number of navigation systems (about half the
total) installed in the aftermarket that are unaffiliated with vehicle manufacturers. Therefore
an audience for more open services is expected. Given proper coordination and a billing
mechanism operated by the content aggregator, these services will proliferate and generate
revenue, much as has the content available via i-Mode.
The suggestion was not only to capture a percentage of the revenues available for such
services in Japan, but also to gain experience and a set of alliances by which services might
eventually be deployed in the U.S.
Before evaluating this proposal, we first take a look at potential Japanese consumer reaction
to new telematics services, both the North American OnStar model and the content
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aggregation model. A full strategic evaluation of both ideas is presented in Section 9,
incorporating feedback from market research.
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8 MARKET RESEARCH
8.1 QUALITATIVE RESEARCH
8.1.1 Objective
The objectives of qualitative research was to obtain feedback on a range of potential service
options including the content aggregation model described in Section 7. This feedback
could then be used to evaluate the viability of these options as well as tailor them in
preparation for design of a precise service offering. More precise design could then involve
more rigorous and narrow quantitative research at a later date.
The primary questions to be answered by the qualitative research were: "How might
customers react to the overall service concept and its features? Does it appeal to them, and
if so, would they consider purchasing it? Based on the outcomes of the research, what might
be the most fruitful areas to pursue?"
Within the scope of this document, the results of research are primarily intended to help
address the question "is there market demand for such a service?"
8.1.2 Methodology
The qualitative research consisted of focus groups held in November, 2000. Attitudes about
two primary service concepts were discussed with different sets of Japanese drivers. Concept
A, consisting of services built upon the existing architecture for car navigation systems, was
discussed with groups segmented by technology usage. Concept B, consisting of OnStar
services in the North American vein (including soon-to-be-released "Virtual Advisor" and
"Personal Calling5" features) was discussed with groups segmented by age. The constitution
of the groups and the study methodology is shown in Figure 16.
s Personal calling enables OnStar subscribers to use their OnStar equipment as a voice-operated, hands-free cell phone.
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Figure 16 - Study Outline
Fieldwork date:
Place :
Sample size:
Study flow:
November 11 (Saturday) & 12 (Sunday), 2000
Shibuya Nexus
95 (see below for sample breakdown)
<Group A: Telematics / i-mode groups>
- Telematics users 8 participants (2 groups)
- Telematics rejecters 17 participants (2 groups)
- i-mode users 18 participants (2 groups)
<Group B : Age based groups>
- 18-34 years old 17 participants (2 groups)
- 35-49 years old 18 participants (2 groups)
- 50 years old or older 17 participants (2 groups)
Reception
Pre-FGI questionnaire (10 minutes)
Focus group interview (120 minutes)
Quantive questionnaire (10 minutes)
Quantitative results were based on the results of
Check-out Pre-FGi ('Focus Group Interview') questionnaire and the post-FGiquantitative questionnaire.
Subsequent to focus groups, participants filled out surveys to gather quantitative indications
of reactions to concepts discussed. Survey questions regarding participants' attitudes (e.g.
satisfaction, interest, or importance) were answered on a 5-point scale. For example:
8.1.3 General comments on participants
All participants were drivers living in the Tokyo area. The composition of the groups was
75% male, with the gender ratio even more skewed in tech-savvy group A.
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"H ow much areyou satisfied with the sevice?"
1 Vey satisfied
2 Satisfied
3 Neither satisfied nor unsatisfied
4 = Unsatisfied
5 = Vey unsatisfied
Internet usage and cell-phone penetration was very high. Across all groups, 80% of
participants answered that they often use the internet. Across aged-based groups alone, the
fraction was 73%, with the lowest usage occurring in the 50+ age group (65%). Cell-phone
penetration, at 94%, was even higher. The lowest penetration again occurred in the 50+
group, where 77% reported using a cell phone. The figure was 100% for the group aged 18-
34, and 89% on average across all aged-based groups.
Car-navi penetration was also significant. In age-based groups, where selection was blind to
factors correlated to car-navi ownership, the average penetration of car-navi devices was
31%. In addition, 48% of those participants (owners and non-owners) plan to equip their
next car with a navigation system
8.1.4 Concept A - Services based on the architecture for car navigation systems in
Japan
This involves making data services available on the screens of Japanese vehicle navigation
systems, both manufacturer-sponsored and installed in the aftermarket. These could include
a variety of convenience and entertainment-related services such as: information about
points of interest, automatic notices of locally available services or products, parking
reservations, information of personal interest, personal streaming "karaoke", MP3
download, and email, either as text or voice-synthesized. Some features, such as music
download, would require third generation wireless support.
These services would be made available as seamlessly as possible inside and outside the
vehicle. For example, they could be provided in the vehicle by "docking" a handheld in a
port connected to the navigation equipment. Maximum attention would be given to making
services available via multiple access channels (i.e., not only car navigation systems, but also
on mobile phones, PDAs, and the fixed-line internet).
8.1.4.1 Questions of primary interest
In addition to the general objectives listed in section 8.1.1, research on concept A addressed
the following sets of questions.
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" Who are the current users of telematics or navigation systems? What do they like and
dislike about these systems? What would they like to see improved?
- How might users of handheld wireless web services (who are assumed to represent the
bulk of future potential customers) differ from other groups in their attitudes about
navigation, and telematics?
- Finally, what might explain the low levels of customer acceptance of current telematics
systems?
8.1.4.2 Primary Results
8.1.4.2.1 General comments regarding car-navigation ownership
The responses to certain survey questions were disaggregated according to whether a user
did or did not own car-navigation equipment. Several top-level trends are noteworthy.
First, although the household incomes of car-navi owners, non-owners, and telematics users
do not differ significantly, their driving patterns do. Non-navi users tend to use their cars
more frequently for shopping, but navi users (and especially telematics users) drive
substantially more on highways or for business purposes. Additionally, telematics users
reported many more weekend trips than navi owners who do not use telematics.
Second, there were only eight telematics participants. The reason for the small number of
users of telematics participants vs. other participants (about half the number obtained for
other audiences) was that it was extremely difficult to locate telematics users. This is
consistent with the low numbers of users reported for the major telematics services in
section 4.4. However, the low market penetration is especially interesting in light of the fact
that among the 15 rejecters, fully a third owned systems with telematics capability.' That is,
6Note, however, that among the 17 car-navi owners within the i-mode and aged-based
groups (whose participants had not been selected on the basis of their exposure to
telematics), there was only one car-navi system with telematics capability, or about 6%.
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although it is clear that a substantial fraction of car-navi owners have equipment capable of
telematics, very few have actually chosen to activate service. Therefore telematics is much
more widely available than it is utilized.
Third, most car-navigation owners who participated equipped their car with navigation
systems as a standard feature or dealer option at time of sale (68%, or 27 out of 40 owners
total across groups A and B). However, in the i-mode group, systems were mainly
purchased in the after-market (6 7%, or 4 out of 6 total). Note that the widest selection and
most advanced systems for car navigation are available in the after-market. Manufacturers
and dealers offer more limited choices.
Finally, although in exit surveys of group A a high percentage of car-navi owners expressed
interested in "replacing" current systems with a live advisor (35% overall), almost all
reported that they are satisfied with their car navigation systems. Additionally, overall intent
to purchase a car-navi system in the future (as measured by the fraction of participants
indicating that they 'definitely' or 'probably' would do so) is very high (63%, vs. a current
ownership level of 42%). Even among the age-based groups, who are more likely to
respond in a way indicative of the general population, purchase intention is 48%, with
current ownership of only 31%. Thus, market penetration in Japan of car-navi systems is
expected to grow rapidly.
8.1.4.2.2 Telematics Users
There were a total of eight participating telematics users: two users of Toyota Monet, two of
BMW Assist (based on the Nissan CompassLink service), one user of Mercedes E-call, and
two users of services attached to car navigation manufacturers. All had acquired their
systems recently.
8.1.4.2.2. 1 Attitudes of current telematics users
Participating telematics users own a range of different systems and vary widely in their
opinions about them. Figure 17 - Satisfaction of telematics users depicts the distribution of
responses. Note that since participants use systems which vary significantly from each other
(e.g., BMW Assist and E-Call have live-advisor support, whereas Monet and the services
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affiliated with car-navi manufacturers do not), the variance in satisfaction levels is
attributable both to differences in product quality and user needs. In particular, the two
owners of the Monet system reported that their reason for subscribing to the system was
that in recently purchased Toyota Crowns the pre-installed navigation system is not
compatible with VICS. Therefore their only way to get traffic information is by subscribing
to Monet. The two "Very Unsatisfied" users in Figure 17 are probably the Monet
subscribers. According to their comments during focus group interviews, their driving time
and usage frequency is low, so they benefit little from their telematics systems.
Figure 17 - Satisfaction of telematics users with their current systems
3
2 2
0
Very Unsatisfied
unsatisfied
Neither Satisfied Very satisfied
To gain insight on the dispersion of user opinion and address potential reasons for currently
low levels of user acceptance, we examine comments from telematics users in detail. Table 4
- Telematics users' opinions regarding their current systems, paraphrases all the comments from
telematics users recorded in the focus group's written report.
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Table 4 - Telematics users' opinions regarding their current systems
Aspects of current systems
Unsatisfactory Divided Satisfactory
* Slow download speeds M Advisor service for route guidance
* Hardware, phone, and subscription fees too 8 Advisor service to set navi route on small
expensive roads
" Can't check car email outside car N Advisor service to provide updated info
* Waiting for download of info you can't use - Advisor who can provide you with
(you get useless info along with the useful precisely the needed information
info) * Info on shops and restaurants
* Required to have a specific wireless carrier * Info about sightseeing and tourist spots
- cannot use current carrier when traveling
= Call-center busy signals * Touch panel
- Extremely poor voice recognition results " Hands free function for phone
* Traffic info out of date
- Navi system difficult to use
- No VICS; need Monet subscription just for
traffic info
m CD/DVD update disks too expensive
The degree of support for "live advisor" services (such as those provided in the BMW Assist
system) is impressive. Equally impressive is the long list of complaints that users had. Note,
however, that some of these complaints have nothing to do with telematics per se. Poor
voice recognition, lack of VICS support, expensive update disks, and navi systems that are
difficult to use are all aspects of the design for the base navigation systems, not their
telematics support.
The telematics-related reasons for current-user dissatisfaction can be categorized as in Table
5.
Table 5 - Reasons for dissatisfaction with current telematics services
- 43 -
Slow data speeds
Content not precise enough to meet users' needs
High prices
Lack of integration or corpatibility with customers' other communications systems
(i.e., existing network senice or email address).
1.
2.
3.
4.
Customers appear to enjoy the live advisor assistance and information about shops,
restaurants, sightseeing and tourist spots while traveling. Unfortunately, it is not known
whether the participants who make use of this information are obtaining it from their
navigation screens, or from a live advisor. Nevertheless, in Table 6 we present a list of
hypothetical subscription and retention reasons consistent with the data in Table 4.
Table 6 - Reasons for subscribing to current telematics systems
1. Adisor assistance, especialy with routing (route information, choice, or setting)
2. Information relevant to location and travel (local shops, restaurants, and tourist
information)
In Table 7, participants' comments on new features are paraphrased. (In some cases, these
ideas were posed by the focus group moderator. In other cases, they were initiated by
participants.)
Table 7 - Telema tics users' comments on and ideas for new features
New features
Rejected Divided Supported
- Mobile shopping w Banking in car " Call-center service added to car-navi system
- Compose email * Video-on-demand - Music download and transfer out of car
in car in car N Downloadable karaoke
- High data costs E Internet access in * Latest maps downloaded and stored
from car - Information screened by preference, not just location
downloaded a Portable navi for 0 Info on nearest hospital
content (music, use in and out of E Show location of friend's cars on map
maps, etc.) car E Check car email anywhere
- Navi can be 0 Sharing info across car-navi, PDA, and home
detached and as . In-car ads that reduce the customer's subscription
PC cost but are screened by preference
- Check on the status of your home from within your
car; control home electronics (i.e., remotely check and
lock your front door)
- Notification via hand-held phone if something
happens to the car while you are not in it
" Services will be great for very busy business-people or
salesmen
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Two popular items are music download and updated maps. An additional theme in the ideas
supported above is that to be relevant, even location-based information must be screened
based on preference, not just location. That is, users do not want to wade through data.
They want to obtain useful information with minimal search effort.
Finally, when asked in exit surveys about their attitudes regarding two service options (a
high-end option which would function like a 3G versions of their current systems; a low-end
option based on a smaller portable screen with downloaded maps plus a live advisor)
current telematics users on average preferred the "high-end" concept even though the "low-
end" concept would reduce purchase cost. Top-two-box interest and purchase-intention
levels for the high-end service were much higher than levels for the low-end service.
8.1.4.2.3 Telematics Rejecters
Of the 17 rejecters of telematics services, 15 own and use navigation systems. Of the 15
navigation systems, 5 have telematics capability that the user has chosen not to activate.
Others have heard of telematics service but declined to install a system that would enable
them to subscribe to it.
8.1.4.2.3. 1. 1. 1 Attitudes of telematics rejecters
In Table 8, we summarize telematics rejecters' comments on and ideas for telematics
features.
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Table 8 - Telema tics rejecters' comments on and ideas for telema tics features
Features
Rejected/Unsatisfactory Divided Supported/Satisfactory
" Verbal route description N Ads (not coupons) 0 Live advisor to set a destination on your navi
from a live advisor (too to reduce the (i.e. CompassLink)
complicated to service's cost - Live advisor to consult when lost or in an
understand or remember) - Maps downloaded accident
" Being dependent on live to vehicle instead - Online banking in the car as better alternative
advisor for the route of disk-based to phone-banking
- Wireless shopping for service (concern a Buying tickets on car screen as alternative to
physical goods from car about cost, service i-Mode screen, which is too small
Composing e-mail in car coverage) 2 Navi system having information like that of
* Receiving e-mail in the car guidebooks
if you have to pay 0 Music download if music is portable and not
additional service provider too costly
for it 2 Local car-park availability based on GPS
" Location-based incentives a Restaurants in the local area; other info based
while driving (too on location and what I want to do or need at
distracting) the time
" Complication of existing - Checking e-mail in a traffic jam
navi - Location-based ads, especially if they can be
" Voice-rec on navi rarely filtered by preferences
works a Location-based incentives while parked
n Vehicle certificate, manual, and maintenance
history in navi
0 Voice recognition if it can be made to
communicate like a human
0 Voice recognition to simplify navi operation
a Automotive link/monitor that tells you what's
wrong with the car so that you know before
bringing it in for service
- Detachable navi that can be moved to back
seat or different car
a Portable navi that can be used outside the car
(wireless internet access, PC, etc.)
= Good for those driving a long time daily
These rejecters of telematics generated an impressive list of potential telematics features,
some of which are already available. The group was not directly asked to discuss reasons for
rejection. However, Table 9 lists reasons for rejection that are consistent with the data in
Table 8.
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Table 9 - Reasons for rejecting telematics
1. Telematics will be too distracting and therefore dangerous while driiing.
2. Telematics is too expensive.
3. I don't spend enough time driving for telematics to be worthwhile.
4. Telematics will be too dificult to use.
5. Telematics will not hefp me navigate better (my primay interest is naigation).
6. Telematics does not protide me with enough services that interest me [customers' interests varied
widey].
Finally, when asked in exit surveys about their attitudes on the two service options ("high-
end" and "low-end") telematics rejecters expressed little preference. Top-two-box interest
and purchase-intention levels for the high-end service were similar to those for the low-end
service.
8.1.4.2.4 i-Mode Users
Of the 18 i-Mode users, only 6 owned car-navigation systems. If asked which one they
prefer, members of this group on average favor the low-end service (based on down-
loading) to the high-end service (based on CD/DVD ROM). Top-two-box interest and
purchase-intention for the high-end service were substantially lower than corresponding
levels for the low-end service. The higher levels of preference for low-end services than
other groups may indicate greater price-sensitivity and/or levels of experience and comfort
with mobile downloading.
8.1.4.2.5 Quantitative Summay
In the quantitative surveys, all participants in the Concept A study were asked to rate the
attractiveness and importance of a number of features. Features that had top-two-box
averages on both dimension greater than 50% are listed here.
1. Downloadable maps
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Participants found this attractive as a way to maintain the most up-to-date routing
information, especially if the downloaded information could be stored for later use.
However, there is apparent price sensitivity to this function, as cost of data download was a
frequently mentioned concern.
2. Location-based information
Up-to-date information about local surroundings was highly valued, including information
about tourist attractions, weather, entertainment, dining, parking, and hospitals. One person
mentioned that they wanted to see pictures of restaurants on their navigation screens in
order to make a better choice. It was emphasized by several participants that location-based
information must be filtered based not only on location, but also by users' personal
preferences and by their interests at a given time. People do not want to wait for download
of information that is not useful to them, nor do they want to sift through pages of text in
their cars.
3. Links to car audio and music download
In-vehicle music download was one of the features that generated a significant interest and
importance level among participants. However, it was emphasized that music should be
storable for later use. Optimally, it also would be portable for use outside the car (home,
portable music player, etc.).
4. Safety and security features
Overall, safety and security features such as theft tracking, automatic airbag deployment
notification, and on-call emergency support generated a great deal of interest. The
telematics rejecter group placed particular emphasis on such services, ranking it third out of
sixteen features surveyed. Other audiences ranked it substantially lower.
5. Voice recognition
Assuming it could be made to have high recognition accuracy (e.g., far better than current
systems), voice recognition was deemed strongly appealing.
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6. GPS
Participants appreciated the importance and attractiveness of GPS in the operation of these
systems.
Location-based advertising acceptable
In addition to the features listed above, a large fraction of participants appeared willing to
tolerate location-based incentives and advertising, provided that these reduce the prices they
pay for service, and provided that users have the ability to "opt-in," selecting the types of ads
or coupons that they receive. Only 21% of participants felt that location-based ads would be
either unattractive or very unattractive.
8.1.5 Concept B - North American OnStar
The primarily lessons from research on North American OnStar are summarized here.
8.1.5.1 OnStar safety and security plan well received
Overall 73% of attendees indicated that they were interested or very interested in the basic
package (safety & security), and 58% indicated that they would probably or definitely
consider subscribing. In focus groups, participants found vehicle theft tracking especially
interesting.
8.1.5.2 Premium services much less popular
A minority of participants expressed interest or purchase intent for the premium plan, which
includes non-emergency support such as route assistance and concierge services.
8.1.5.3 Personal calling and virtual advisor also relatively unpopular
Personal calling was appealing to a relatively low fraction of respondents. This lack of
popularity was most extreme in the 18-34 year-old age-group, in which very few expressed
interest or consideration to purchase. In informal polls taken within the focus group
interviews, nearly all participants indicated that they use cell phones in their cars. However,
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only a few polled said that they used a hands-free kit or expressed any intention of
purchasing one in the future. Despite Japanese laws to the contrary, participants regularly
and comfortably use cell phones in their vehicles while driving.
Virtual advisor was found most interesting to participants in the youngest age group, within
which about a quarter indicated interest and intent to consider purchase.
8.1.5.4 Pricing estimates
In exit surveys, participants were asked to estimate the expected price and their willingness
to pay for service elements discussed in the focus group interviews. Whereas OnStar
premium and basic pricings in the U.S. differ by about $200 per year, respondents in these
focus group indicated that they were on average not willing to pay any more for premium
services than they were for basic services. OnStar premium services were perceived to add
little incremental value above that provided by basic service.
8.2 SYNDICATED STUDY
GM also participated in a syndicated quantitative study of the interests and usage patterns of
Japanese drivers with respect to automotive information technology.
8.2.1 Phase 1 - Safety and security features found interesting
The initial phase of the study was a large scale survey (with several hundred respondents)
directed at understanding drivers' attitudes and current usage of various information
technology in and around driving (9). This included car navigation systems, cellular phones,
web-enabled cellular phones, and multimedia equipment, as well as other technology and
capabilities that are currently unavailable.
The primary lesson from Phase 1 was that despite opinions of industry experts that
Japanese consumers would not care for functionality focused on safety and security, drivers
indicated substantial interest in it. Participants were asked to indicate how appealing it
7 Because this was a syndicated study to which GM does not own full rights of reproduction, the results are only alluded to
here in summary fashion.
- 50 -
would be to "have a button" in their car that could be pushed to obtain remote assistance in
an emergency situation. Respondents indicated more interest in that feature than in any
other tested functionality:
8.2.2 Phase 2
The second phase of the study included a conjoint analysis of preferences of both car-
navigation owners and non-owners regarding various service options (10). The functionality
tested is shown in Figure 18 - Options Tested tia Conjoint Analysis. Primary lessons from Phase
2 are summarized in this section.
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8.2.2.1 Usage of navigation systems about to explode
The majority of respondents indicated intention to purchase a navigation system for their
next vehicle. This is consistent with the smaller study conducted by GM.
8.2.2.2 Emergency functionality appears important, but willingness to pay for
higher service levels is questionable
Results of Phase 2 with respect to overall utility of emergency functionality were
inconclusive. Emergency-related options tested (including cell phone usage, an emergency
button, and automatic emergency notification) accounted for approximately 7% of overall
utility. However, the exact interpretation of this data is obscure, albeit not a good sign for
OnStar. Automatic emergency notification (at a subscription fee of merely $100 per year)
was ranked in such a manner as to indicate that it provided less utility than cell-phone usage.
It is not clear how this should be interpreted. However, the highest utility implementation
was a simple button that, for $30 per year, could be pushed in the event of emergency.
8.2.2.3 Live advisor services for destination setting questionable
The utility of a live operator who for a fee of 50 cents would help set navi destination was
judged as rather low - indeed, it was ranked lower than reliance on map-disk alone. Again,
the precise interpretation of the survey (not available to the author in English at the time of
this writing) was somewhat unclear. In any case, the overall dispersion of utility for the
category, 2%, indicated that the issue itself was not of great importance in the context of
other choices tested.
8.2.2.4 Method of Route Guidance: When coupled with voice synthesis, symbols
provide a large fraction of the utility attainable by full blown navi maps
for some groups of customers
This overall category of choice accounted for 12% of overall utility. "Map plus voice
guidance" obtained the maximum utility. However, "symbols plus voice guidance" obtained
on average 70% of maximum utility for all respondents, 75% of maximum utility for
respondents who do not currently use navigation systems, and almost 90% of maximum
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utility for respondents who bought lower-priced navigation systems (i.e., those costing
150,000 yen or less).
8.2.2.5 The most important issue was electronic toil collection
This category alone accounted for 17% of the variation in utility.
8.2.2.6 Price accounted for 10% of overall utility
The price decision for the navigation system accounted on average for about 10% of overall
utility. Maximum utility was attained at a price level of 70,000 yen. Minimum utility
occurred at 200,000 yen.
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9 BUSINESS EVALUATION OF MOBILE SERVICE OPTIONS
9.1 NORTH AMERICAN ONSTAR MODEL
9.1.1 Customers: Inferences from Market Research
Based on the market research for Concept B, there is a large segment interested in OnStar's
basic plan. The study of Concept A provides additional support to this conclusion: safety
and security ranks among those features most interesting to Concept A participants as a
whole, and it appeals particularly strongly to telematics rejecters.
Since the safety & security package provides no regular navigation support, candidate
customers for OnStar's basic service include both users and non-users of car navigation
systems. Market research is consistent with the following characteristics of potential
customers of OnStar's basic plan:
" they will pay something for services that protect them, their families, or their belongings
from the effects of accident or theft
" they spend at least as much time in the car as the average driver, and probably more
" they value simplicity, and may have rejected a car-navi system because of cost or
perceived difficulty of operation
" if they do own a car-navi system, they may have rejected telematics with an 'information'
or 'recreational' focus because they feel it is frivolous, dangerously distracting, or too
difficult to use
Analysis of the focus groups also indicates that a small but significant segment will be
interested in OnStar's premium services. However, the RouteAssist service of the premium
plan needs to be modified based on the market research and background analysis. The
complexity of Japanese roads and addressing and the high level of usage of more
sophisticated navigation services makes it unlikely that route guidance can be satisfactorily
provide via human operators. A more viable option from a customer perspective would be
to operate RouteAssist services in the spirit of the Compass-Link call center, providing
destination-setting assistance and route advice to navi owners. Verbal route guidance by an
operator may also be useful outside of cities or when a driver can consult a map. That said,
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the following additional characteristics of potential customers for premium services are
consistent with the market research:
* they spend more time than average in the car and tend to take more long trips on the
highway than subscribers to the basic plan
* they may use their car for business purposes
they are quite busy in their daily lives
= they reject complex systems
Customer response to options outside the two service plans is likely to be subdued. Market
research has shown that the appeal of "personal calling" services is slight at best - most
Japanese are quite comfortable continuing to use their cell phones in the car. It is very
unlikely that many would pay a premium over current wireless prices for the right to use
what amounts to a hands-free cell phone. Likewise, "virtual advisor" service does not
currently hold much appeal to the broader population. However, it may appeal to some
users of premium services, who probably drive more frequently.
9.1.2 Partners
Implementation of this model would necessitate OEM agreements with various Japanese
vehicle manufacturers. This should be easiest to do with GM's Japanese affiliates. However,
the scale enabled by such relationships alone is not sufficient to sustain a worthwhile
business (see section 9.1.7).
GM would therefore need to look outside its affiliates. In this, it would need to overcome
the fact that major automotive manufacturers in Japan already have their own approaches to
the provision of telematics services. Thus, closing a deal would in many cases entail
convincing a manufacturer to adopt an additional, competing approach to telematics.
The strategy for doing so would be based largely on OnStar's differentiation as a provider of
safety and security services. I.e., given the significantly reduced costs and safety/security-
focus of OnStar systems verses others, it could be argued that OnStar systems are designed
to satisfy a different, non-competing set of needs than manufacturer-operated approaches.
Thus, any revenues produced by OnStar systems would supplement those produced by
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manufacturer systems, not compete with them. OnStar service could also be provided as an
"option" within the context of manufacturer-operated systems.
However, an approach which differentiates OnStar as a provider of safety and security is
strategically questionable over the long term, as it may limit opportunities for future growth
outside of safety and security services. Additionally, OnStar may face the threat of backward
integration of current telematics operations to include OnStar functionality within their own
systems. Many existing telematics operations already operate a call center, and it would seem
feasible to extend these operations to serve customers' safety and security needs, especially
as navi costs drop to make it more broadly affordable.
A related question is whether, in a market which converges on modified navi as a telematics
platform, customers will tolerate and pay for two brands and associated relationships. If not,
then OnStar may have to function as a supplier that is invisible to the customer, with the
manufacturer-operated telematics operator maintaining the real face with the customer and
controlling access to future revenue streams. This would clearly limit OnStar's ability to
charge needed margins for its services. (This issue is addressed in the financial model of
section 9.1.7 by providing a variable percentage of subscription revenue to OnStar's
partners.)
Finally, OnStar will face a substantial initial hurdle created by the need to convince auto
manufacturers that their customers are interested in OnStar functionality: The consensus
opinion at OEMs and other industry participants is that Japanese customers are not
interested in services centered around safety and security. Additional, more rigorous market
research might be needed to convince them that their customers will value these services.
9.1.3 Suppliers
Wireless cellular services in Japan are provided by three major suppliers. Market leader NT1
DoCoMo is the dominant player. It is part of NT17 Communications, a former government
monopoly in which the government still owns equity. NTT DoCoMo has a 60% share of
the market for wireless services, is the only carrier with complete nationwide coverage, and
generally leads other carriers in new service provision by 6 months to a year. Of the other
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two players, one, KDDI, is heavily backed by Toyota Motor Corporation, which owns its
own telematics service and has already chosen to utilize Japan Mayday Corporation for its
safety-and-security-related services. The remaining player is Japan Telecom, which runs
cellular services under the J-phone name. As the last-place player with a history of grabbing
market share through low prices, J-phone may be the most logical party to approach for a re-
sale agreement or purchase of bulk minutes. It is also the only carrier known to have excess
spectrum available. However, initially OnStar will only be able to guarantee usage from
within a relatively small base of GM-affiliated installations. Thus, OnStar is unlikely to
extract high margins from cellular wireless operators.
Indeed, any competition in the cellular market will work against OnStar in some ways.
According to market research customers are comfortable with the use of their cellular
phones while driving. They are therefore very unlikely to pay any premium vs. normal
handheld services, and the lower the price of cellular services, the less customers will be
willing to pay for in-vehicle "personal calling.9"
9.1.4 Competitors and Substitutes
OnStar will face a number of competitors, some of which focus on similar market segments
and some of which do not do so currently, but may present a threat in the future.
Direct competition will include the "Helpnet" service by Japan Mayday, Inc., as well as
Daimler-Chrysler's E-call service. Helpnet is focused on emergency response assistance, as
is E-call. The low pricing of both providers will present an issue for OnStar. Helpnet, if it is
to be believed, plans to charge only 4000 yen annually, less than $40 per year or $4 per
month. Daimler-Chrysler's ITGS/E-call service is apparently being sold for 1000 yen per
* Unless 3G creates tremendous excess capacity for voice calls. This is an unknown based on
how quickly 3G bandwidth is filled by bandwidth-intensive applications. Naturally, wireless
carriers are working as hard as possible to facilitate the latter. In addition, it is likely that 3G
deployment will go through a gradual ramp over a period of several years.
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month, or less than $10 per month. ITGS/E-call includes convenience services (via screen-
based telematics) as well as emergency services. However, OnStar may be helped by the
high cost of traditional telematics equipment for the ITGS/E-call approach: the typical price
now being charged for equipment that adds telematics capability to navigation systems is
40,000 to 60,000 yen, or $400 to $600. This price is in addition to the price paid for
navigation equipment, which is 100,000 yen at minimum. . Mayday also is tying its services
to navigation systems as a base platform. OnStar should be able to charge significantly less
for its hardware (U.S. retail pricing is between three and six hundred dollars depending on
the service), and may therefore still be able to charge a slight premium vs. ITGS/E-call for
service provision. However, if Mayday truly operates its "Helpnet" service as a "non-
profit" (which it appears to have the intention of doing) this could make it extremely
difficult for OnStar to beat Helpnet on pricing, either with customers or in negotiations with
automotive manufactures."
Neither E-call's nor Mayday's services are currently as rich as OnStar's. They do not provide
vehicle theft tracking or extensive integration with vehicle electronics. The same is true of
Mayday. However, nothing significant stands in the way of either firm initiating those
services (such as vehicle theft tracking) that do not require extensive vehicle design work.
Mayday, because of its ties to Japanese automotive manufacturers, may present the highest
threat, especially if it can lock OnStar out of accounts at OEMs. Only time will tell. If
Mayday or Daimler Chrysler exploit their early-mover advantages to contract with
automotive OEMs before OnStar enters the market, it will be difficult to displace them:
relationships are very important in Japanese business.
Nissan Compass-Link, which operates a call center for Nissan, Mitsubishi, and for the BMW
Assist service, already competes in the "convenience" / "concierge" space. Again, if there
appears to be an opportunity to do so, there may not be a lot (government approval
processes aside) to prevent if from extending its operations into the safety and security
space. However, its ties to the number two Japanese automotive manufacturer may prevent
it from gaining many more contracts with automotive OEMs.
10 Alternatively, its non-profit nature could mean that it is not aggressive and not a competitive threat.
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Also, if OnStar attempts to supply the safety and security functionality for the Japanese
telematics systems of automotive manufacturers, it may face potential "backward
integration" by other telematics services. However, this might be difficult since the approval
cycle for domestic firms to start an emergency call center is likely to take several years.
CompassLink could face the same problem - of course, it is not known for certain that they
do not already have future plans to provide such services, in which case they would be likely
to be part way through the application process. But it is more likely that they are depending
on Helpnet to provide these types of services.
Nevertheless, OnStar will have a price advantage vs. other telematics approaches for those
customers who are not interested in purchasing a navigation system, since OnStar allows
avoidance of the big upfront cost of navigation equipment. However, E-call is likely to have
the same sorts of capabilities, if it so chooses to deploy them. And additionally, as a
consumer electronics item, cost of navigation equipment is moving ever downward.
Lastly, the Japan Automotive Federation (the Japan equivalent of the American Auto
Association) provides roadside assistance to over 40% of Japanese drivers.
9.1.5 Capabilities
OnStar is probably better than other operations at performing the vehicle integration
required. Therefore its ability to execute is probably superior to other entities that might
attempt to compete directly (e.g. Daimler Chrysler E-call or Mayday). However, this must
be weighed against the lead in time-to-market already enjoyed by these firms. In fact, an
option that should be explored would be an arrangement to utilize Daimler E-call
infrastructure as call center, as opposed to OnStar doing its own IT call center integration.
9.1.6 Barriers to Entry
GM as an international company has advantage verses local operations in that it can use
international political relationships to speed the approval process for an emergency call
center. Also, non-recoverable promotional expenses on the order of hundreds of millions of
dollars are required to compete effectively in a consumer business of this sort. Taken
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together, these two factors (and especially the former) may protect OnStar and its known
direct competitors (Daimler E-call and "Mayday" services) from further direct competition
within a niche of services focused on safety and security.
9.1.7 Financial Analysis
The financial model used here is a simplified version of the model used by OnStar in its
initial evaluation of international expansion opportunities. This allows easy reference and
comparison between model parameters before and after the study described in this
document. However, by design, the model's simplicity also protects all detailed information
about OnStar cost and margin projections for the various services, at the same time
preserving enough structure to make possible a reasonable assessment of the business
opportunity under discussion here.
The model encompasses three revenue streams. First, it includes revenue from services
provided under a basic subscription plan centered on safety and security. Second, it
considers revenue from premium subscriptions, which comprise basic service plus route
guidance and concierge services from a live advisor. And third, it accounts for revenue
generation from hardware sales - the equipment required in each vehicle in order to enable
service.
The basic sales approach taken by OnStar during its growth phase is to provide the first
year's service free. In the model, hardware is priced in such a manner as to offset the costs
of providing a year's free service. That is, the gross margin on hardware sales to a given
customer is approximately equal to the expected cost of serving that customer during their
first year of subscription.
Model input parameters are described in Appendix A: Model Parametersfor simplified OnStar
financial model.
Note that the model considers only factory-installed implementation, not aftermarket
approaches. Therefore service launch only occurs in 2003, after a substantial period of
design activities needed in order to integrate OnStar services in a factory-installed fashion.
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Also, note the use of the designation of "relevant" vehicles. The definition used in the
initial study was as shown in Table 10.
Table 10 - Definition of 'Relevant' Vehicles for North American Vehicle Market
However, this definition is over-restrictive for the Japan marketplace. Japanese drive smaller
cars, and they more frequently equip them with aftermarket electronics (the most common
of which is the Television, followed by navigation systems). Thus, for the purpose of the
study documented in this paper, a different definition is used.
Included: all passenger cars and trucks except mini-vehicles.
Excluded: mini-vehicles."
That said, values for each parameter were inferred based on the market conditions described
in the current study. These are compared in Appendix B: Values of OnStar Finandal model
parameters to values used for the initial financial assessment of the Japan opportunity.
11 For the purposes of this document, since a detailed break-out of mini-vehicles by manufacturer was not available for
non-GM-affiliated manufacturers, the number of mini-vehicles for each non-affiliated manufacturer are estimated based on
the following algorithm: Total mini-vehicles = mini-cars + (21%) light-trucks. This estimation results in the appropriate
number of mini-vehicles for the market as a whole. These mini-trucks are mini-cars with cargo space, either open (like a
pick-up) or closed (like a van). Note that the correct percentage is used for GM-affiliated OEMs, since this data was
available at the time of this writing.
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Vehicle Segments Included
" Car
High, Sport High, Large,
Upper Medium, Intermediate
- Truck / Commercial
Large Utility, Medium Utility
- Large Family Wagon, Large
Pickup, Medium Van
Large Van, Light Commercial
Medium/Heavy Passenger
Car Derived
Vehicle Segments Excluded
* Car
Mini, Small, Lower Medium
Small Family Wagon, Sport
Low
" Truck / Commercial
Small Van, Medium Pickup
Under the assumptions made, if OnStar obtained contracts with GM-Japan and its affiliates,
but failed to obtain agreements with other auto manufacturers, this would amount to a 48
million dollar loss in today's dollars, or NPV = (48 million). See Appendix C: Example
financial valuation - OnStarJapan sewing GM-Afiliated customers only. In order to achieve NPV
0, the amount of the total marketplace from which GM needs commitments is 16%. This is
about 24% (almost 1/4) the volume of all non-mini passenger vehicles. Roughly 8% of this
share of non-mini vehicles can come from GM and its affiliates. It would thus need a
contribution of about 16% of non-mini vehicles to come from non-affiliated manufacturers.
Stated in yet other terms, it needs commitments from non-affiliated manufacturers
representing about 17% [i.e., 16/(100-8)] the volume of all non-mini vehicles sold by non-
affiliated OEMs. Thus, glibly, GM would need to convince about 1/5 of its non-mini
competition in Japan to adopt OnStar service in order to break even in the sense of positive
NPV.
What would this mean if put in terms of agreements with specific manufacturers? Toyota,
with 41% (vs. the 16% required) would be more than adequate, as would Nissan. However,
no other single manufacturer would be adequate. Aside from that, contracts with multiple
OEMs would be needed. Honda, with 12% of the relevant market, would be the next
recommended target.
Other Manufacturer's Percent of Mfr.'s Mfr.'s share of
Manufacturer Share of Total Vehicles that are the non-mini
Market relevant (i.e. non- market-place
mini)
Toyota 29% 94% 41%
Nissan 13% 94% 19%
Honda 12% 66% 12%
Mitsubishi 10% 61% 9%
Mazda 5% 85% 7%
Daihatsu 9% 30% 4%
These results are highly sensitive to retention-rate (1 - "chum" as expressed in
telecommunications circles) and to OnStar's penetration of relevant vehicles. Thus, if
- 63 -
OnStar can achieve higher retention-rate or penetration rates than the values assumed in the
model, the fraction of volume needed from competitors will decline.
9.1.8 Conclusions
The business case for OnStar services in the tradition of the North American model is
marginally viable but highly sensitive to retention-rate, penetration rate, and the fraction of
non-GM-affiliated manufacturers that OnStar can sign up. From a practical perspective, one
major OEM (i.e. Toyota, Nissan or Honda) is needed to justify the endeavor on financial
terms. However, as of last fall no manufactures appeared to have expressed interest in such
collaboration. To be truly attractive, the OnStar business model needs adaptation to
competitive and market conditions in Japan.
9.2 SERVICES BASED ON THE EXISTING ARCHITECTURE FOR CAR
NAVIGATION SYSTEMS IN JAPAN
9.2.1 Customers: Inferences from Market Research and Market Trends
Drivers are interested in a wide variety of services that will soon be supported via telematics
on navigation-based platforms. As cost per bit decreases and technology improves, potential
services will evolve beyond text-based information to include features that are interesting to
more people. Additionally, existing services will be provided in a manner that is simpler and
easier to use. Significant new features will include music-on-demand, photos of recreational
locations, downloads of updated map information, and more accessible and varied location-
based information (to match the interests of more people). Aside from the growth in
bandwidth provided by the move to 3G transmission networks, these features will be
enabled by improved voice recognition, the proliferation of standards for location-based
data via GPS, and more widely used personalization engines to provide a filter for
information transmitted to the end user.
In addition, as these technological enablers evolve to support it, opportunities will increase
to provide meaningful, targeted advertising to customers on the go. These will be tolerated
so long as they are truly relevant to customers' needs (e.g. location-based and screened
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according to customer preferences and interests at the time) and customers have the ability
to opt-out.
Many of these trends are occurring in handset as well as navi-screen channels of distribution.
However, navi-screens have three differences from handset markets that will require
fundamental modifications to handset services:
1. Screen size
Because the screen is larger, data is more readily accessible on a car-navigation screen
than a handset screen.
2. GPS
Location-based information will be available sooner and more easily in the vehicle than
on the handset
3. Travel
Even more than with handsets, the central "mission" people have while they are
connected telematically is to travel from point A to point B. Therefore content that is
relevant to this purpose is will more likely meet the average user's needs than content
that is not. This means that the most rapidly adopted content will helps customers with
one of the following: (a) how to 'get there'; (b) where to go; (c) what to do when they
arrive; (d) having a better experience on the way (entertainment, productivity) mithout
jeopardizing their core purpose of transportation. In the Japan environment, where long
trips are less common and directions are more complicated, the market has already
rapidly embraced one application that fulfills the first part -- navigation tells people how to
get there.
As bandwidth increases, standards for location-based information proliferate, and navigation
systems continue to add telematics capability (particularly capability that provides more open
access to a range of content sources), firms will become aware of the opportunity to gain
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distribution over navi screens, and will construct content sources and applications that justify
audience interest, just as has happened with i-Mode in the handset world.
However, because Japanese customers spend less time in their cars or on highways, and
therefore have less attention to dedicate to these services , costs will have to fall low enough
and services will have to become compelling and simple enough to be worth the price and
attention paid to them. Again, this will happen as transmission speeds increase, cost per bit
decreases, more open standards take hold, and enabling technologies like voice recognition
and personalization become better developed and more prevalent.
Especially if this happens in a world where content is open (positive indications that this will
occur are described in Section 4.4) then there will be large opportunities for "content
aggregation." That is, many customers will appreciate it if someone helps select, organize,
integrate, and make the best content accessible to them, just as Yahoo, MSN, or AOL
attempts to do in the fixed internet world.
9.2.2 Competitors and Substitutes
Even if it is able to obtain the best partners, GM will still have significant competition in this
area. Internet portals that are likely to have interest in this business include AOL Japan
(now funded as a joint venture with NTT DoCoMo), Sonet (a Sony ISP), Yahoo Japan, and
several other well-funded ISPs and portal pages.
Wireless carriers will have an interest, too. Potentially the strongest overall competition
from any source may come from NTT DoCoMo, which already has a car-navi offering in
exactly this area. It appears to be transferring its i-Mode business model to the car-navi
world: that is, NTT DoCoMo will be the content aggregator, billing entity, and face with the
customer (see Figure 12 - Value chain for NTT DoCoMo's i-Navi-Link). KDDI, which is
part-owned by Toyota Motor Corporation, has been involved in supplying cellular
communications services to telematics services for several years and also appears to be
opening up access to their handheld EZ-web service via car-navi. And J-phone has already
pioneered the availability of location-based maps on handhelds and adopted the Honda
system for transfer of location-coordinates.
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Existing telematics services will naturally plan to migrate their services in the most profitable
direction. Those which are attached to individual automotive manufacturers may have some
difficulties serving competitors through factory-installed implementations of equipment.
However, (a) if standards become more open, customers may be able to subscribe to any
service they want, irregardless of who installed the system; (b) industry coalitions for mutual
gain do and will continue to exist - e.g. the Nissan/BMW/Mitsubishi usage of the
CompassLink system.
Finally, car-navigation manufacturers themselves have begun to bundle telematics services
within their systems, and constitute potential competition especially if their work on open
standards goes beyond hardware and software protocols toward creation of a shared car-
navigation portal (recall Figure 14 - Press release: consumer electronicsfirms cooperate on standards for
internet-enabled car navigation).
9.2.3 Capabilities
GM's capabilities and strategic assets pertinent to the operation of this type of business in
Japan are weak. OnStar in the US has focused its operations on "hands-free" technology
designed to operate independently of a car navigation system. Furthermore, it does not
actually own capabilities in voice recognition (except a small share in General Magic), and
has no experience in Japanese-language voice recognition. Existing Japanese players (car-
navi manufacturers and telematics providers) already do.
As a potential provider of emergency-support technology and services (i.e., those relied upon
in the "base" OnStar package in North America), OnStar may have capabilities to
contribute. However, as discussed in section 9.1.4, it already has potential competitors in
this arena (Mayday, Daimler-Chrysler E-call), and it is unlikely that provision of these
safety/security services will enable it to partake of revenue streams in the areas of
information/entertainment, productivity/convenience if the core capabilities for providing
those services originate with other firms. Fundamentally, safety and security services are
useful, but not essential for a vehicle-centric mobile content aggregation business.
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Finally, as we have seen in the financial analysis of section 9.1.7, the relevant Japanese
affiliates of GM do not account for a financially significant volume in vehicle sales (the total
number of relevant customers is of such a small scale that it is far from being able to
collectively sustain an OnStar-like business). Mini drivers are very unlikely to install a
navigation system which is 10% to 30% of the price of their vehicle.
Furthermore, since there is no direct relationship between the automotive manufacturers and
the majority of their existing drivers, GM cannot utilize existing drivers of GM-affiliated
vehicles to help initiate a business in this area without incurring significant upfront costs of
customer acquisition (the affiliates do not even have access for marketing purposes to
existing drivers' names and addresses). Such upfront costs are likely to be of the size that
they would decrease the net value of these customer relationships to the point where they
represent only a slight improvement over acquisition of unrelated customers.
9.2.4 Partners
Due to a lack of core capabilities that are required to compete in this area, GM would need
to develop business relationships with multiple Japanese partners in order to launch this
business. However, because GM even lacks a significant customer base for such a venture,
there is little of local value that GM can offer partners that would entice them into a
relationship on terms favorable to GM.
Of course, GM can offer access to capital. But this in itself will be insufficiently appealing
to the firms that would be required to be competitively viable: major consumer electronics
corporations, wireless carriers, automotive manufacturers, and established portals or ISPs.
These are not startups, and are therefore unlikely to have any more trouble raising capital
than GM (despite its enormity).
In fact, GM's meaningful strategic resources and capabilities all lie overseas.
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9.2.5 Conclusions
The single perspective under which GM's involvement in this venture might have significant
value as an independent Japanese business (both for potential partners, and for GM) is the
international one, which we explore in the next section.
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10 THE "INTERNATIONAL CARD"
GM has vehicle sales worldwide, and therefore the potential attraction to a local player of
teaming up with GM in its local market may go beyond local considerations. More
specifically, could GM leverage its global scope in relationships with potential Japanese
partners in such a manner as to entice those partners into providing the support it needs to
create a viable content aggregation business? Although GM has little to offer potential
partners in the Japan market, should it attempt to justify their support via promises of
increased collaboration internationally?
There are at least two aspects to consider in addressing this question, could GM accomplish
this given organizational structure and strategies, and should it even want to. The first part,
implementation, requires a more thorough look at GM's organizational structure in areas
related to mobile services.
10.1 ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS
The e-GM organization is an operating division of GM based in the Detroit area. However,
it also has international units. These outposts have dual-reporting responsibilities, both into
e-GM headquarters in Detroit and to GM international operating units for their region. For
example, e-GM Japan reports into e-GM Asia Pacific (responsible both to GM Asia Pacific
Automotive Operations and to e-GM headquarters in Detroit) as well as directly into e-GM
headquarters. In general, funding for projects in e-GM Japan can come from either GM
Asia Pacific or from e-GM headquarters.
OnStar, as a sub-unit of the e-GM division, obeys the same reporting structures. However,
global expansion of the OnStar business raises fundamental and challenging questions about
its optimal role in the GM corporate portfolio.
In the US, OnStar has announced that it is providing service to Honda (through Acura) and
Toyota (through Lexus). By serving GM competitors, OnStar behaves as would an arms-
length subsidiary that maximizes profits separately from its parent. Certainly, if OnStar was
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not perceived by OEM customers as acting independently of GM, it would be very difficult
for it to provide credible service to GM competitors.
However, OnStar is also a strategic resource in GM's corporate-level automotive portfolio.
In that case, it should be deployed by GM in such a manner as to advance GM's integrated
strategic objectives worldwide. Close relationships to GM's international automotive
reporting units would then appear good way to accomplish this integration Like e-GM,
OnStar then maximizes its value by acting as a resource for other GM units.
Whereas automotive OEM customers naturally desire an OnStar independent of its
corporate parent, GM's international automotive groups benefit by maintaining a higher
degree of exclusivity over OnStar capabilities. Such conflicting pressures must be carefully
managed to implement effective global strategy. They create challenges for transnational
projects.
10.2 STRATEGIC ANALYSIS
Given organizational considerations, it would be challenging for GM to offer credible
international support in exchange for assistance in the Japan market. However, a more
fundamental issue is to consider how it would create value by doing so. Unless it identifies
some real business synergy in relationships with a potential Japanese partner, GM would
essentially be giving away value in one market in order to gain value in another.
For example, take the case of wireless carriers. Let us imagine that GM obtains preferential
treatment from a wireless carrier in setting up a mobile service business in Japan (above and
beyond that offered by the carrier to other automotive manufacturers). In return, GM (or
OnStar) might collaborate more closely with the carrier or its international partners in other
regions. However, the US is a far more competitive market for wireless carriers than Japan -
no single wireless carrier has a clear advantage over others in cost or functionality. Thus, by
giving preferential treatment to a Japanese carrier in the U.S. environment, GM would be
giving up opportunities to purchase the cheapest service from the lowest-cost bidder in a
competitive and relatively efficient marketplace. Whatever support (and therefore
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opportunity for value creation) GM gains in Japan, it would be likely to lose in the U.S. by
giving away the chance to buy the best services in the U.S. market.
Giving special privileges to a Japanese carrier only makes sense if the Japanese relationship is
going to provide some additional value to the U.S. business. Example might include
operational experience, or the chance to transfer technology from Japan to the U.S. From
the Japanese wireless carrier perspective, a similar analysis applies. Getting in bed with GM
only provides value if GM can provide something extra in terms of insight, technology, or
other factors that are critical to its business strategy - something that it cannot easily
purchase in the open marketplace.
If the U.S. market evolves in the direction currently followed by the Japanese market (i.e.,
navigation systems in most cars, with telematics based on these navigation systems) then
GM, as the leader in U.S. telematics, can probably provide this value to a Japanese firm
seeking to enter the U.S. Given how much time American's spend in their cars, telematics
will over the long term be an important consideration in the American business case of any
enterprise involved in the wireless industry. However, what would be the value to GM?
That value would primarily accrue from the chance to exploit its participation in the
Japanese market to learn and develop capabilities faster than competitors "back home."
Once developed, these capabilities could be more easily "exported" to the U.S. environment.
However, it appears currently that the U.S. telematics market will not evolve in a "Japanese"
direction at all. OnStar is emphasizing a screen-less approach to telematics. They have
made this position a core part of their emphasis on safety and security since it minimizes
driver distraction. Other U.S. auto manufacturers and consumer telematics firms appear
inclined to follow suit.
If this is the case, there will be little applicable knowledge to gain from a Japanese
collaboration, and the net value-creation opportunities from the relationship will be slight.
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11 RECOMMENDATIONS
Two recommendations for the future evolution of GM-related mobile service businesses in
Japan are given below, one for each of the service options tested above.
11.1 RECOMMENDATION FOR CONTENT AGGREGATION CONCEPT
A: CONTRACT WITH EXISTING TELEMATICS PROVIDERS TO
SERVE GM-AFFILIATES
A content aggregation venture with significant GM ownership utilizing car-navigation
equipment as a base platform is extremely unlikely. There are simply too many more
experienced players already competing for this market, and GM has too little to contribute
locally to such a business to justify an ownership stake among them or a new venture.
However, this does not eliminate the potential value to GM-affiliated vehicle manufacturers
of being able to offer their own customers telematics services in the future.
GM can add value to its affiliates and put itself in a position to gain potentially useful
knowledge of screen-based telematics services by organizing interested parties within Suzuki,
Isuzu, and Fuji Heavy Industries (Subaru) to jointly contract for telematics services with an
emerging provider of such services. By contracting jointly for these services as opposed to
independently, these companies can obtain better financial terms, and also have a better
chance at negotiating access to future opportunities for value creation. In the negotiations
required to contract for these services (primary candidates to approach should include
Honda for their InterNavi system, NT DoCoMo for their i-Navi link, and Nissan for their
CompassLink system), GM and its Japan affiliates should push for an arrangement that
would allow GM-affiliated companies to maintain the primary interface with their customers
(or at least the appearance to customers of doing so), as well as maintain access to data
generated from these customers' and their usage patterns. The customer relationship and
associated customer data are resources that can be mined for future value opportunities that
are difficult to estimate quantitatively, but are extremely important in the current automotive
environment, in which manufacturers are beginning to realize and exploit the value of more
direct customer relationships.
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11.2 RECOMMENDATION FOR CONCEPT B: ADD SERVER-SIDE
NAVIGATION
The business case outlined above for OnStar services in the North American model is viable
but risky as a consequence of competition and Japanese customer needs that differ from
those of North Americans. These factors together with negative industry sentiment
regarding the value of safety and security services contribute to high uncertainty about
OnStar's attainable level of overall market penetration.
With regard to customer needs, the following differences are central: (1) As a consequence
of the complexity and opacity of the Japanese road network, navigation via interaction with a
human operator alone would be very challenging, and therefore customers exhibit little
interest in route assistance in the style of the OnStar "Premium package." (2) The average
Japanese driver spends far less time in vehicle than the average American driver and takes a
smaller proportion of longer trips, so their willingness to pay for services intended to occupy
idle time in the vehicle is lower than otherwise.
To address these issues and increase overall penetration and revenue from vehicles on the
road, OnStar should take two steps if it wishes to launch services in the Japan market:
1. Eliminate the subscription model in favor of a pay-per-use model for all services aside
from those related to safety and security.
This would permit customers to use services as needed, thus capturing revenue from
customers who anticipate that their relatively rare usage would not justify a fixed
subscription fee.
2. Recast OnStar services to include server-side navigation support through low cost
hardware available in the aftermarket.
Due to the high price-tag of navigation equipment (150,000 to 200,000 yen and up) and the
obvious utility of navigation services on Japanese roads, there is a group of price-sensitive
Japanese drivers who would like to have navigation services, but are unwilling to acquire
them due to the large upfront investment required. In fact, in a survey of Japanese drivers
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who rejected car-navi systems, price was the most frequently mentioned reason for rejection
(11).12 By offering server-side turn-by-turn navigation and specifying a smaller, symbolic (as
opposed to graphic-intensive) screen supplemented by packet-based automatic voice-
synthesized route guidance, OnStar can partner with a consumer electronics manufacturer to
create navigation equipment that requires no CD/DVD-ROM database and has a much less
expensive screen. This type of solution is consistent with results from the Phase 2
syndicated study described in section 8.2.2.4 (Method of Route Guidance: When coupled with voice
synthesis, symbols prvide a larqefraction of the utility attainable by full blown nati mapsfor some groups of
customers). These changes should reduce the price to consumers of navigation equipment by
at least a factor of two from current hardware.
Additionally, marketing this equipment through aftermarket auto-shops will expand initial
distribution by eliminating the initial need for OnStar to obtain contracts with OEMs that
already operate their own telematics services, and it will decrease time to market for launch
by removing extensive design activities required for factory-installed vehicle integration from
the critical path. It is also consistent with the expressed buying habits and preferences of
participating i-Mode users described in sections 8.1.4.2.1 and 8.1.4.2.4.
Finally, it will on the short term remove OnStar from direct competition with telematics
players who are pursuing an approach based on traditional navigation systems. Because it
would be marketed as a "simple" solution to price-sensitive consumers, OnStar can argue to
potential partners that it is expanding the market for telematics services, rather than
cannibalizing their other lines of business.
This modification is consistent with OnStar's North American emphasis on simplicity of
design and minimization of driver distraction. It is also consistent with OnStar's
architectural approach to service provision, which keeps hardware costs low and permits
remote upgrades by keeping system intelligence on the server instead of installing it in the
car. Finally, the additional work needed to commercialize the system in Japan should be
12 53% of respondents mentioned price, which was the most frequently cited reason. 40% said that the information was
available on other devices, and this was the second most often cited reason.
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leverageable in the US environment since it represents a likely evolution path for current
OnStar services.
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12 CONCLUSION
Traditional OnStar in the Japan environment, though it appeared to be an interesting
opportunity based on an initial assessment of broad market factors, turns out to be marginal
and risky after a close analysis of competition, industry structure, industry sentiment, and
financial data. A more lucrative opportunity may exist if OnStar can extend its business
model to comprehend low-cost, server-side, turn-by-turn navigation as a technology
disruptive to emerging navigation and telematics architectures. However, as transmission
bandwidth increases, it will be increasing likely that other firms will attempt that approach.
Therefore OnStar needs to act fast to evaluate feasibility, gauge customer acceptance, and
obtain partners for such a venture.
Second, there is a near-term business opportunity for future telematics services in Japan
based on emerging car-navi platforms, but not for General Motors and its affiliates. Instead,
the relevant value which GM and its affiliates can realize is that inherent in opportunities to
get "closer to customers." GM should organize its affiliates to negotiate deals with an
emerging provider of Japanese telematics that will enable the affiliates to offer their
customers a telematics solution as well as keep the door open on future value opportunities
to be gained from developing richer, ongoing customer relationships.
Finally, the "international card" as a means of improving chances for the success of a Japan
mobile service venture is limited by: (a) GM's ability to act as a "global" corporation as
opposed to just a "multi-national"; (b) the likelihood of divergence between the trajectories
of Japanese, screen-based telematics, and North American, voice-based telematics.
However, if GM organizes its affiliates to contract for self-branded telematics services in the
Japan environment, it will still maintain an opportunity to learn about the Japanese
approach. This knowledge will be useful if and when the technologies employed by the
North American telematics market-place converge with those in Japan.
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APPENDIX A: MODEL PARAMETERS FOR SIMPLIFIED ONSTAR
FINANCIAL MODEL
Model Parameter
Initial Industry Volume (2001)
Industry Growth
Growth in Perpetuity
Retention Rate
Premium Subscription Rate
Basic Subscription Rate
Percent Basic Revenue to Partners
Percent Premium Service Revenue to Partners
Premium Subscription Penetration
Activation Rate
WACC
Hardware Cost per Unit
GM & Affiliates Market Share
GM & Affiliates Percent Relevant
Other Manufacturers Market Share
Other Manufacturers Percent Relevant
Initial Penetration of Relevant Vehicles
Saturated Penetration of GM & Affiliated
Relevant Vehicles
Saturated Penetration of Other Relevant
Description
Total unit passenger-vehicle sales (in thousands)
Anticipated annual growth in unit sales
Growth in free cash flows beyond the initial time horizon
of the model
Percentage of subscribers who continue their subscriptions
from one year to the next
Price per month of a premium subscription.
Price per month of a basic subscription
Percentage of revenue from basic services (not
subscriptions) paid to partners.
Percentage of revenue from premium services (not
subscriptions) paid to partners.
Percentage of subscribers who choose the premium plan.
Percentage of customers purchasing OnStar-equipped
vehicles who actually activate their subscriptions (note
that OnStar receives the hardware revenue for vehicle
sales irregardless of activation).
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (financial Discount
Rate in valuation)
Cost to OnStar of vehicle hardware.
Unit market share of GM and its Japan affiliates. It is
assumed that OnStar equipment will be installed in some
percentage of these manufacturer's "relevant" vehicles
(see below).
Percentage of GM and GM-affiliate vehicles sold that are
realistic candidates for installation of OnStar equipment.
Combined unit market share of the other manufacturers
(besides GM or its affiliates) in which OnStar equipment
is being installed.
Percentage of other manufacturers' vehicles sold that are
realistic candidates for installation of OnStar equipment.
Percentage of relevant vehicles sold that are equipped with
OnStar at sale during the year of OnStar's initial launch.
Maximum percentage (achieved over time) of relevant
vehicles sold by GM and its affiliates that are equipped
with OnStar at sale.
Maximum percentage (achieved over time) of relevant
vehicles sold by other manufacturers that are equipped
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Model Parameter
Vehicles
Years to Saturated Penetration
Initial Fixed Costs
Structural Growth Factor
Launch Costs
Launch Duration
Tax Rate
Description
with OnStar at sale.
Number of years after launch before saturated penetration
is achieved. During this time period penetration grows
linearly from initial penetration to saturated penetration.
Initial fixed costs (independent of subscriptions or vehicle
sales).
Percentage growth in fixed costs resulting from a 1%
growth in subscription revenue.
Annual spend (on top of fixed or structural costs) required
for OnStar's initial launch. Primarily composed of
marketing and promotional expenses.
Number of years required for launch.
Corporate tax rate in Japan.
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APPENDIX B: VALUES OF ONSTAR FINANCIAL MODEL
PARAMETERS
Parameter
Initial Industry Volume (2001)
Industry Growth
Growth in Perpetuity
Retention Rate
Premium Subscription Rate
Basic Subscription Rate
Percent Basic Revenue to Partners
Percent Premium Service Revenue to Partners
Premium Subscription Penetration
Activation Rate
WACC
Hardware Cost per Unit
GM & Affiliate Market Share
GM & Affiliate Percent Relevant
Other Manufacturer Market Share
Other Manufacturer Percent Relevant
Initial Penetration of Relevant Vehicles
Saturated Penetration of GM & Affiliated
Relevant Vehicles
Initial Current Explanation
6400 6015 updated to reflect recent growth
figures
1.40% same
5% same
75% 70% lower since competition - customers
switch more frequently
33.25 28.00 lower due to competition and lack of
perceived customer value (see
market research)
16.60 12.00 lower due to competition (i.e. this is
20% premium over ITGS/E-call)
0% 1.0% nonzero because of competition
0% 0.5% nonzero because of competition
30% 15% lower since competition and
significantly higher price than many
customers are willing to pay
according to market research
90% same
15% 17% More non-diversifiable risk than a
typical GM project (calculation by
author utilizing SprintPCS and
Nextel as comparables)
same same
18% same
9% 31% higher since smaller cars are more
relevant in Japan than elsewhere
83% variable The original assessment assumed all
manufacturers install OnStar
equipment on a penetrated fraction
of their vehicles. This assessment
will assume only certain
manufacturers agree to do this.
41% variable Depends on specific OEMs. In
general, a higher rate is used for
same reason as above.
5% same
40% same Even at 40%, this is only 2/3 of the
fraction of customers who expressed
purchase intent; also, the price being
charged (base subscription rate) is
well below "willingness to pay", due
to competitive factors
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Parameter
Saturated Penetration of Other Relevant
Vehicles
Years to Saturated Penetration
Initial Fixed Costs
Structural Growth Factor
Launch Costs
Launch Duration
Tax Rate
Initial Current Explanation
20% 30% We assume competition even within
OEMs with which OnStar gains
contracts. Therefore this is
equivalent to capturing / of the
share of 60% customers with some
degree of purchase intent..
5 same
same same
10% same
same same
2
42%
same
same
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